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Executive Summary
In the United States, the Food and DrugAdministration (FDA) agency is
responsible for regulating the safety and efficacyof biopharmaceutical drug
products. Furthermore, the FDA is tasked withspeeding new medical inno-
vations to market. These two missionscreate an inherent tension within the
agency and between the agency and key stakeholders. Oftentimes,communica-
tions and interactions between regulatedcompanies and the FDA suffer.
The focus of this research ison the interactions between the FDA and the bio-
pharmaceutical companies that perform drugR&D. To assess the current issues
and state of communication and interactionbetween the FDA and industry,we
carried out a survey of industry leadershipin R&D and regulatory positionsas
well as senior leadership at the FDA who haveresponsibility for drug evalua-
tion and oversight.
Based on 49 industry and eight FDA interviewswe conducted, we found
that industry seeks additional structuredand informal interactions with the
FDA, especially during Phase II of development.Overall, industry placed
greater value on additional communication thandid the FDA. Furthermore,
industry interviewees indicated that theywere willing to pay Prescription
Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA)-like fees duringclinical development to ensure
that the FDA could hire additional, well-qualifiedstaff to assist with protocol
reviews and decision-making.
Based on our survey and discussions,we uncovered several thematic oppor-
tunities to improve interactions between theFDA and industry and to reduce
clinical development times: (1) developmetrics and goals at the FDA for clinical
development times in exchange for PDUFAlike fees; (2) establish an oversight
board consisting of industryagency officials, and premier external scientists
(possibly at NIH or CDC) to evaluate and auditretrospectively completed and
terminated drug projects; and (3) constructa knowledge database that can
simultaneously protect proprietary data whileallowing sponsor companies to
understand safety issues and problems ofpreviously developed/failed drug
programs.Bemdt, Gottschalk, and Strobeck
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While profound scientific and medicalchallenges face the FDA and industry,
the first step to reducing developmenttimes and associated costs and facilitat-
ing innovation is to provide anefficient regulatory process that reduces unnec-
essary uncertainty and delaysdue to lack of communication and interaction.
"The FDA is responsible for protecting thepublic health by assuring the safety, efficacy
and security of human and veterinary drugs,biological products, medical devices...
and.. .for advancing the public health byhelping to speed innovations that makemedi-
cines and foods more effective, saferand more affordable..."
From the FDA Mission Statement,(http: / /www.fda.gov/opacom/m0rech0e5/
mission.html)
"If biomedical science is to deliver on itspromise, scientific creativity and effort must
also be focused on improving the medicalproduct development process itself, with the
explicit goal of robust development pathwaysthat are efficient and predictable and
result in products that are safe, effectiveand available to patients. We must modernize
the critical development path that leadsfrom scientific discovery to the patient."
From Challenge and Opportunity onthe Critical Path to New Medical Products,U.S.
Department of Health and HumanServices, Food and Drug Administration,
March 2004, p. 5.
"Communication leads to increased collaboration,and increased collaboration leads to
successful drug development."
Anonymous Interviewee, Global Headof Company R&D
FDA Commissioner Mark McClellanbelieves ". . . that poor communication between
the FDA and firms seeking drug approvaladds months to reviews - and costs compa-
nies millions of dollars."
From Daniel Kadlec, "Will ThisExperiment Work?" Time, 7 July 2003.
I.Introduction and Background
Major scientific breakthroughs, newdiscovery technologies, and signif-
icant increases in life science R&Dspending in both the private sector
and at the National Institutes ofHealth have helped create prospects
for the impending discovery and developmentof significant new medi-
cines to treat unmet healthneeds. Despite these scientific advancesand
enhanced R&D efforts, the number of averageannual New Drug Appli-
cations ("NDAs") and new BiologicsLicense Applications ("BLAs")
approved by the U.S. Food and DrugAdministration has been smaller
after 2000 than in the mid-1990s.'Moreover, recent estimates suggest
the average costs of bringing a newmedicine to market have increasedOpportunities for Improving the Drug DevelopmentProcess 93
sharply to between $800 million and$1.7 billion, with the lower esti-
mate being two and a half times higher thansimilar inflation-adjusted
estimates published a dozenyears earlier.2
This increase in costs of bringingnew medicines to market may be
somewhat surprising since, spurred byCongressional legislation,over
the last decade review times at theFDA have actually been declining.
Specifically, available evidencesuggests that the passage and imple-
mentation of the Prescription Drug UserFee Act in 1992, and itssucces-
sors in 1997 and 2002, have resulted in industry andthe FDA working
together to reduce mean and medianNDA/BLA approval review times
substantially, by more than 40percent across a wide range of therapeu-
tic classes.3
While the shortening of approvalreview times at the FDA has resulted
in new drugs comingon to the U.S. market more rapidly, other things
equal, this FDA review timecomprises only a small proportionabout
10 percent to 15 percentof the totaltime required to discover, develop
and market a new medical product.
The total time in drug developmentis typically broken down into
preclinical and clinical stages. Priorto a sponsor filing an Investiga-
tional New Drug ("IND") applicationwith the FDA, authorizing clini-
cal testing of a new compound for safetyin healthy humans, sponsors
typically engage in a preclinical drugdiscovery process that lasts from
one to five years. Notably, the time between the INDauthorization and
the ffling of the NDA/BLA is muchlengthier and, unlike the NDA/BLA
review process, this interval has becomelonger rather than shorter. For
example, one recent study reports thatover the eight-year period 1994-
2002, the average time elapsed betweenthe IND and NDA/BLA ffling
was 76.7 months (about 6.4 years), virtually thesame as the 77.3 month
mean over the previous eight-year period from 1986-1994.In compar-
ison, these more recentmeans are about a third larger than the 57.8
month (4.8 years) mean time intervalbetween IND to NDA/BLA filing
during the 1978-1986 time period,and more than 50 percentgreater
than that between 1970 and 1978 (49.2months, or 4.1 years).4
What are the underlying factors leadingto increased development
times and costs? Why have theopportunities created by significant
scientific and computational advancesnot yet resulted in greaternum-
bers of successful and less costlynew therapies being approved? How
can industry and the FDA adaptor transform themselves to help make
the drug developmentprocessboth preclinical and clinicalmore
productive?Berndt, Gottschalk, and Strobeck
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Given that drug development times aremuch longer than approval
review times, and that the formerhave been increasing rather thanfall-
ing in recent decades, it is clearthat the drug development process mer-
its a close examination. Thatis the focus of the researchreported here,
which is based on results from a2004 survey of 57 senior R&Dand
regulatory personnel in industryand at the FDA.
The research reported here complements arecent FDA initiative.
Specifically, in its March 2004 "CriticalPath" document, Innovation or
Stagnation: Challenge and Opportunity onthe Critical Path to New Medi-
cal Products, the FDA considers abroad range of underlying scientific
and manufacturing as well asclinical development issues for all types
of medical products_pharmaceUticalsbiologics, devices, diagnostics,
etc. By comparison, here wefocus our attention on clinicaldevelop-
ment efforts involving onlypharmaceuticals and biologics (together
called "drugs").
In particular, we report herethe results of a recentlycompleted con-
fidential interview survey projectassessing the nature of communi-
cations between the FDA and industryduring the drug development
process, and identifyingopportunities to improve the managementof
this process. The survey results werecompiled after conducting inter-
views with 49 seniorR&D/regulatory affairs officials at sevenbiotech/
biopharmaceutical firms, seven pharmaceuticalcompanies, and three
contract research organizations(CROs). To obtain comparable perspec-
tives from the FDA, we alsoconducted analogous interviews witheight
senior FDA officials.
Two features of this survey deservespecial note. First, the industry
officials we interviewed were seniorR&D and regulatory personnel,
and in particular were not in thefinancial, marketing or public affairs
divisions of these organizations; theviews of these R&D andregulatory
personnel may differ considerably from managerselsewhere in these
companies. Second, all surveyinterviews were carried out between
January 8, 2004 and May 27, 2004, atleast five months prior to the Sep-
tember 30, 2004 voluntarywithdrawal by Merck & Co. of the Cox-2
inhibitor Vioxx, and the subsequent setof events involving FDA over-
sight of other pain killers, as well ashearings on the pediatric safety of
antidepressant medications.
The outline of this paper is asfollows. In Section II we provide a
brief summary of the clinical drugdevelopment process, and focus
on significantmilestones and FDA-industryinteractions during this
process. In SectionIII we describe our researchmethods, while inOpportunities for Improving the Drug DevelopmentProcess 95
Section IV we discuss ten sets ofsurvey findings. We con-unent on
related qualitative and "thinking outsidethe box" de novo responses
further in Section V1 summarize themesin FDA and industry interview-
ees' recommendations in Section VI, andnote study limitations in Sec-
tion VII. A more detailed quantitativeanalysis of our findings, along
with a set of appendixes providingfurther details concerning study
design and research methods,are contained in a preliminary draft ver-
sion of this paper, availableupon request from the authors.5
II.Brief Overview of the DrugDevelopment Process
The process of basic discovery throughnew drug approval consists of
preclinical and clinical development. Itsstructure, along with typical
timelines and a recent estimate ofconditional transition and cumula-
tive attrition rates, is summarized infigure 4.1.6 The preclinical portion
of development begins with basic discoveryand research and extends
through animal testing. Earlyportions of preclinical development
consist of scientific in vitro and in vivoexperiments and validation of
principles and concepts; such researchtakes place within academic,
government and industry laboratories. Generallya lead or candidate
compound is first identified and isolatedafter screening thousands of
chemicals/proteins againsta specific biological target. Next safety/
toxicity animal studies are conductedwith this compound. Aftercar-
rying out extensive pharmacokinetic andpharmacodynamic testing in
various animal models, the developingcompany, known as the spon-
sor, can file an Investigational New Drug ("IND")application, which
must clear the FDA before human testingcan commence in the U.S. The
length of this predlinical developmentprocess is highly variable, but it
typically lasts between one and five years.7
Once an IND application clears the FDA,a sponsor can initiate clini-
cal studies in humans. Approximately40 percent of INDs transitionto
Phase I trials.8 Phase I clinical trialsare designed primarily to test for
safety and tolerability of the drugin humans through the generation
of pharmacokinetic data involving theabsorption, distribution, metab-
olism and excretion of the drug. Thisphase usually involves a small
group of healthy, nominally paid volunteers, numberingfrom 20 to 100
individuals, and lasts betweenone and three months. Approximately
75 percent of compounds transition fromPhase I into Phase II.
In Phase II, the preliminary effectivenessof the candidate drug is
assessed, as is safety and tolerability viacontinued monitoring withinFigure 4.1
Duration and transition probabilities of drugdevelopment phases.
dose ranges established in the PhaseI studies. Phase II trials often
involve several hundred unpaidvolunteers diagnosed with a particu-
lar illness/condition, andtypically take from six months to two years
to complete. Slightly lessthan 50 percent of NMEstested in Phase II
proceed into Phase III.
Phase III trials, often called pivotalclinical trials, are designed to
evaluate statistically the safety andefficacy of the drug compared to
placebo or standard of care within alarger and typically more diverse
population. These trials involvehundreds to several thousand patients
(depending in part on the therapeutic area,and whether the drug treats
an acute or chroniccondition), and often include examinationof alter-
native formulations and dosesof the drug. Due to these characteristics,
the Phase III trials are the mostcostly stage of drug development.In
most cases the sponsor conductsseveral Phase III trials, with the aver-
age length of time of theentire Phase III process being aboutfour years.
It is estimated that about 64 percentof drugs tested in Phase III trials
transition successfully into NDAs orBLAs.9
Once submitted to the FDAfor review, approximately 90 percent
of NDAs/BLA5 eventually receiveFDA approval and are marketed.
Review times now average about one year.When the various between-
phase and final approval transitionprobabilities are multiplied to
achieve a cumulative probability,the chance of a leading drugcandi-
date successfully proceeding frompreclinical to approval is about S
percent; for every 12-13compounds that were serious candidates in
preclinical research, only one drug willmake it to market.
96 Berndt, Gottschalk, and Strobeck
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Phase IV trials, also known as post-marketingstudies, are in some
cases performed as a condition required by the FDA forinitial market
approval. In other cases theyare undertaken to obtain approval for a
new indication, or are carried out for marketingpurposes. Phase IV
studies are designed to observe the (sometimeslong-term) effects of
a drug in a larger and more heterogeneous population thanstudied
in the Phase III trials. It is not unusual for PhaseIV studies to involve
thousands of patients; onaverage, these studies take three to four years,
though for some chronic conditions, theycan last much longer. Once on
the market, new patent-protected drugstypically have 11 to 13 years
of market exclusivity before facing genericcompetition, although they
likely face therapeutic competition muchearlier.
Because of the long developmentprocess (about 7.5 years on aver-
age from IND filing to final NDA/BLA approval),a substantial por-
tion of drug development costs involves theopportunity cost of capital,
i.e., earnings the sponsor could have realizedhad it instead invested
funds elsewhere. For example, in the DiMasi,Hansen and Grabowski
(2003) study cited earlier, of the $802 millionaverage cost of bringing
a drug to market, almost exactly half ($403 million) consisted ofdirect
out-of-pocket costs, while the remainder reflectedopportunity costs,
capitalized at an 11 percent annual real discountrate. One recent study
has reported that if the probability ofsuccessfully transitioning from
Phase Ito market approval improved bya factor of one-half (from 21.5
percent to 33 percent), capitalized costsper drug would be reduced by
about 30 percent (from $802 to $560 MM,or $242MM). In comparison,
a reduction of 50 percent in out-of-pocket costsacross all clinical devel-
opment phases would have virtually thesame effect, reducing capital-
ized costs by $235MM.'° Simply stated, timeis money, and the longer
the development time for drugs, thegreater the capital that is invested
cumulatively. Efforts that result in reducedpreclinical and clinical
development times are therefore likelyto be particularly valuable.
To understand the management issuesencountered in the course
of drug development, it is useful to depictindustry-FDA interactions
along the pathway involving various preclinicaland clinical phases
of the drug development process. Figure 4.2, takenfrom the FDA's
March 2004 paper, "Innovationor Stagnation? Challenge and Oppor-
tunity on the Critical Path to New Medical Products,"provides one
characterization of the mostcommon industry-FDA interactions. Spon-
sors often meet with the agency before submittingan IND to discuss
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Industry-FDA interactions during drug development.
submissions of new protocols, anddiscussions of preliminary results
from testing. Among the multipleinformal and formal interactions
between the sponsor and the FDA,there are three critical meetings.
One of the key meetings is calledthe end of Phase IT-A meeting, during
which preliminary findings involvingdose and safety are discussed, as
well as future clinical protocols andendpoints. Another key meeting
is the end of Phase II meeting("Phase TI-B"), in which detailed plans
are discussed forthe design of the pivotal clinical trials,and agreement
is sought on methods andendpoints proposed for the evaluationof
safety and efficacy. A third key meetingis the pre-BLA/NDA submis-
sion meeting, in which sponsors meetwith medical reviewers and other
FDA officials to discuss the clinicalpackage about to be ified.
III.Research Methods
A series of 49 interviews eachinvolving at least two of the three coau-
thors was undertaken with a totalof 17 drug developing companies
that had locations in the United States.These interviews, conducted
between January 8, 2004 and April 29,2004, involved seven medium to
large biotechnology/biopharmaceuticalfirms, seven very large phar-
maceutical companies, and three contractresearch organizations (one
of them privately held). All of thepharmaceutical and biotechnology!
biopharmaceutical firms are public companies,and all but one has at
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17 public companiesas of April 2004 was more than a trillion dollars.
Interviews with a total of eight senior FDAofficials were conducted by
at least two of the three coauthorson May 4, 2004 and May 27, 2004.
For the industry interviews,an attempt was made to identify indi-
viduals at senior level positions within theircompany and who had
significant responsibilities for preclinicaldevelopment, clinical devel-
opment, regulatory oversight,or combinations of these activities.
Of the 49 individuals interviewed, 88percent held positions of Vice-
President, Executive Vice-President,or Global Head of R&D or Regula-
tory Affairs. Twenty-two individualswere interviewed from pharma-
ceutical companies, 21 from biotech/biopharmaceuticalcompanies,
and 6 from CROs. For the FDA, interviewswere conducted with eight
individuals, each currentlya division head or higher, and all having
experiences across multiple FDA officesor divisions.
Both industry and FDA interviewsinvolved quantitative and quali-
tative aspects. The initial portion of eachinterview involved asking the
interviewee to rank responses toa series of statements or questions on
a scale of one to five. Respondents identified the issuesto which they
wished to return, to discuss them ingreater depth. In the qualitative
portion of the interview, the intervieweewas encouraged to elaborate
on the earlier quantitative responses of particularinterest. Industry
interviews typically lasted 60-90 minutes,while those at the FDA were
all approximately 60 minutes long.
IV.Results from the Survey
We now summarize the tenmost common and striking findings from
our survey, primarily in a qualitative fashion;a more detailed and
quantitative discussion is found elsewhere.'1
Industry Has Guarded Respect for the FDA
At the beginning of eachcompany interview, we asked interviewees to
rate the agency's ability to regulate drug developmentand appropri-
ately weigh the risks and benefits ofnew drugs. Industry gave the FDA
an average rating of "good," a rating that didnot vary significantly
across biotech, pharmaceutical and CR0 respondents. Qualitativecom-
ments from interviewees indicateda great deal of respect for the FDA
as a whole and recognition of the challenging rolethe agency plays in
evaluating new drugs.Berndt, Gottschalk, and Strobeck 100
Although industry's average rating of theFDA's effectiveness at keep-
ing unsafe drugs from the market was evenhigher (between "good"
and "excellent"), follow-up questioningresulted in many respondents
qualifying their answers to this questionwith the comment that the
agency was partlyresponsible for delaying the progress of some very
valuable new therapies to market, in some casesbeing overly vigilant.
One global head of R&D statedthe agency tended inappropriately to
weigh drug development as a"risk-benefit" analysis. Instead, the indi-
vidual argued, a "risk-risk" analysiswould often be more appropriate,
since the tradeoff frequently involvescomparing the risks of approv-
ing a drug having certain safety issueswith the risks that patients face
without having the therapeuticavailable as a treatment option. This
individual also stated that often it is therisk of the drug being used in
inappropriate populations or combinationtherapies that causes safety
concerns and delays at theFDA.
PDUFA Has Had a SignificantBeneficial Impact on Approval Times,
but Other Trends Are Worrisome toIndustrj
Industry interviewees agreed forthe most part that the FDA had made
significant efforts to reduce drug approvaltimes, but that the amount
and impact of efforts by the FDA to reduceclinical development times
were modest at best. Responsesfrom the FDA interviewees werequali-
tatively similar to those from industry.
FDA interviewees acknowledgedthat in terms of affecting review
approval times, PDUFA had brought about ahuge cultural shift at the
FDA. As one FDA official put it,"The review process is now a Swiss
train, not an Italian train." However, anumber of agency officials also
acknowledged that the focus on reducingclinical development times
was still not universallyshared, particularly among reviewing staff.For
example, one senior official noted thatfor decades facilitating reduc-
tions in clinical development timeshad not been perceived as a priority
at the FDA, nor perhaps even arole the FDA ought to play. Instead,
the traditional attitude of reviewershas been one of asking for what-
ever data is necessary,without much concern to time delays and costs
imposed on the sponsor. Attention tothe second mission of the FDA
promoting the public health by helping tospeed access to new medical
innovationswas a relatively recentphenomenon and less universally
shared, said another official. On the otherhand, both FDA and indus-
try personnel noted that theFDA's recent record on issuing guidanceOpportunities for Improving the Drug Development Process 101
documents was improving, and that these documents (aswell as meet-
ings leading up to them) helped reduce uncertainties in thedrug devel-
opment process. Several interviewees specifically identifieda recent
FDA guidance document involving pediatric clinicalinvestigations as
being exemplary.
When asked whether the European Medicines EvaluationAgency
("EMEA") was more efficient than the FDA inapproving drugs, about
two-thirds of industry interviewees either disagreedor were neutral.
One "best practice" of the EMEA cited by several intervieweeswas its
convening of an expert meeting of regulators,sponsors and academics
whenever significant developments ina therapeutic area or treatment
modality had taken place.
A number of industry interviewees commented thathistorically, a
strength of the FDA has been that its mandate has been limitedto eval-
uating medicines on the basis of scientific criteria, andnot on the basis
of commercial or reimbursement considerations.Companies' expe-
riences with the EMEA and national health authorities havehistori-
cally been less satisfactory. Specifically, in Europe bothreimbursement
and approval decisions were oftenmore deeply intertwined. Others
believed that the EMEA's stand on wanting comparativetrials (not just
placebo controls) was unfortunate, for that implicitly introducedcost
and price concerns, rather than a focuson scientific issues involving
efficacy. Several interviewees voicedconcerns that with passage of the
Medicare Drug Benefit legislation and increased collaborationbetween
the FDA and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,this sepa-
ration of mandates could become more blurred in the U.S.as well.
Excessive Variability across Divisions at the FDA
In almost every company interview, respondentsindicated that there
was a high degree of variability in competence, communications and
implementation of rules and regulationsacross divisions at the FDA.
A substantial number of respondents characterized theFDA as being
organized like a "cottage industry," where divisionsare relatively inde-
pendent, interacting in highly variable ways withsponsors.
While acknowledging that various divisions in the Centerfor Drug
Evaluation and Research ("CDER")are engaged in different thera-
peutic areas and thus would reasonably be expectedto have different
requirements for establishing safety and efficacy,company inter-
viewees repeatedly stated that theways and extent to which divisions102 Berndt, Gottschalk, and Strobeck
interact and respond to sponsors is highlyvariable, from simple mat-
ters such as returning phone calls to morecomplex issues such as feed-
back on clinical protocols and NDAs/BLAs.
Several divisions were consistently identified byindustry as having
"best practices" that accelerated the drug development processand
made it more predictable. These best practicesincluded the following:
rapid turnaround of agreement on meeting minutes(in some cases
before the end of the meeting, projected onto a screenvisible by all);
invitation by the FDA to the sponsor to make a half-daypresentation
to the therapeutic division on a noveldrug, including a discussion of
the underlying science and outcome metrics;and
implementation of an open communication policy,including FDA
commitment of within 24-hour acknowledgementof sponsor phone
call.
However, several other divisions were identifiedby interviewees as
having "worst practices." Such practicesincluded:
very poor communicationprotocols (only willing to discuss issues
via letters, and not the telephone);
extended time delay in resolving issues relative toFDA-sponsor
commitments, including multiple changes inpreviously agreed upon
decisions between the sponsor and the FDA;
ambiguous advice and unwillingness to commit toprotocols; and
preoccupation with minor statistical issues essentiallyunrelated to
therapy evaluation, e.g., a patient's bowel surgerywhile on an antide-
pressant.
Agency officials are very much awareof variability in communica-
tions protocols across divisions. When askedhow sponsor companies
would rate the consistency of communicationsand interactions across
therapeutic divisions, FDA interviewees rated these as on averagebeing
slightly above poor. One senior agencyofficial stated that an outside
consultant had recently been retained toaddress how best practices
could be defined across the FDA's divisions, andwhat metrics could
be put in place to monitor progress. In aninitial attempt to address
these issues explicitly, in October 2003the FDA issued a draft guid-
ance document on Good ReviewManagement Principles, designed
for both industry and FDA staff. At the timeof our interviews in
May2004, apparently this document was in the processof being revised.Opportunities for Improving the Drug DevelopmentProcess 103
As an aside, this individual also notedsome disagreement with the
above-named best practice of the FDA andindustry agreeing on min-
utes at the end of meetings, and perhapseven projecting them on a
screen for all to see. One potential problem with that, thisindividual
argued, was that the minutes might be unableadequately to explain
why a particular decision had been made.The underlying rationale
was often important, and if not memorialized in minutes, withfading
memories its absence could complicate downstreamnegotiations and
decision-making, as wellas obfuscate applicability to other develop-
ment projects.
Biotech companies in particular expressedconcern over the merger
of the Center for Biologics Evaluation andResearch (CBER) and CDER,
noting that CBER had establisheda track record of engaging in many
of the best practices (quickresponse to sponsor inquiries, accessibility
of reviewers and leadership, proactiveinterest in the underlying sci-
ence) which they feared might not besustained under the auspices of
an augmented CDER.
Mixed Views on Appropriate Training of MedicalReviewers
Industry respondents rated the training of medicalreviewers after join-
ing the agency (not their previous educationor training) as generally
being "fair" to "poor." Follow-up questionsrevealed that in fact indus-
try has relatively little knowledge of the on-the-joband other formal
training FDA medical reviewers receive, althoughseveral interviewees
indicated they had made presentationsat an "FDA campus." Numer-
ous company interviewees acknowledged that the FDA medicalreview-
ers have a very difficult job, that many work long hours andlikely are
underpaid relative to industry employees.
In comparison, FDA respondents rated theongoing training of their
medical reviewers much higher, beingon average "good." However,
follow-up discussion with FDA officials revealedthat while the scien-
tific training of reviewers was generally ofhigh quality, in most cases
they had little if any management training.One FDA official noted
wryly that since so many of the reviewerswere trained as physicians
and/or academics, it should not be surprisingthat their "people skill"
and "management skill" setsmay be lacking, and that industry might
understandably assess them as being of low qualityon these dimen-
sions. Another FDA interviewee noted thatas part of their training
new medical reviewers are required to attend special classes,includ-
ing courses that focus on critical writing andcommunication skills, but104 Berndt, Gottschalk, and Strobeck
that most of the learning is still"in-service" or on-the-job training. One
division director indicated with satisfactionthe use of an annual "West
Virginia retreat" that emphasizedpeople skill development, not science
education. A strong mentoring programwould be most helpful, stated
another agency individual, augmentedwith some formal management
education. Citing previous efforts thatresulted in "reviewers impervi-
ous to managementtraining," one agency official also pointed outthat
care is needed to ensurethat new recruits are not so far along intheir
careers to be unable tochange their working attitudes andhabits
particularly if they are physicians.
Differences between industry and FDAofficials' perceptions also
emerged in response to a related questionassessing the quality of FDA
reviewers. While the average industry responsewas between "fair"
and "good," the FDA average rating wassignificantly higher, between
"good" and "excellent."
However, when asked to evaluate the FDAleadership (team leader,
deputy division director, and divisiondirector) of medical reviewers,
industry respondents ranked theleadership considerably higher than
the medical reviewers, on averagebetween "fair" and "good." Follow-
up questioningrevealed that company interactions with FDAleader-
ship one or more levels above themedical reviewer were generally
positive. Industry respondents explainedthat excellent medical review-
ers were likely to become teamleaders and move up through the FDA
hierarchy, generating higher ratings for theleadership. Another indus-
try official pointed out that overthe last five years the FDA had made
significant efforts in hiring qualified seniorleadership. As an example,
the individual noted that just several years agothe FDA's CBER office
hired a distinguished imaging specialist,who has since been moved to
CDER; no previous radiopharmaceuticaldivision head had ever been
a radiologist.
Industry interviewees expressedsignificant concern over the turn-
over rate of medicalreviewers at the FDA (particularly intoxicology),
and while unable to cite quantitativeevidence, a number suggested
that turnover at the FDA was higherthan in industry for positions
of equal responsibility. More importantly, uponturnover of a medi-
cal reviewer, companies were oftenrequired to revisit numerous
previous decisions that had been agreed uponwith the agency, caus-
ing unnecessary delays (although in someother cases, speeding up
reviews when a very senior reviewerwith idiosyncratic scientific views
finally retired). Several respondentssuggested that a formal hand-
off procedure, involving participationby both FDA reviewers andOpportunities for Improving the Drug DevelopmentProcess 105
sponsor, take place whenever a turnoveroccurs at a critical review
level. Companies also acknowledged, however,that in some cases turn-
over within their regulatory group also delayed drugdevelopment.12
FDA interviewees indicated that in their viewturnover at the medical
reviewer level had been decreasing, unlike thatat the more senior divi-
sion director level.
Tensions Exist within Companieson Strategies for Dealing with
the FDA
Pharmaceutical and biotechnologycompanies were asked how well
they were organized to deal with theFDA. While both biotech and
pharmaceutical companies envisaged themselvesas on average being
"good" in this respect, biotech's self-perceptionswere slightly higher
than those by pharmaceutical respondents.
Follow-up discussion revealed thatan elaborate regulatory group
is typically set up within eachcompany, acting as the primary link
between the rest of the company and the FDA.The majority of inter-
viewees indicated that this structure usuallyworks reasonably well.
However, several interviewees noted thatpressures from general man-
agement and marketing occasionally forced the regulatorygroup into
confrontational situations with the FDA. Moreover,a substantial num-
ber acknowledged that mergersor acquisitions had made interacting
with the FDA more difficult, in part becauseof inconsistent regulatory
practices, and different histories and culturesamong the new partners
in how aggressive or accommodating theyshould be with the FDA,
resulting in delayed internal decision-making.FDA officials concurred,
indicating that in their experience,mergers and acquisitions often led
to loss of some of the best scientists, disagreementson dosing, labeling
and other clinical strategies previouslyemployed by the new partners,
and confusion and uncertainty resulting indelayed communications
with the FDA.
Diversity in Confronting and Disagreeingwith the FDA
Industry officials had bimodalresponses to questions regarding
whether companies were fearful of disagreeingwith the agency on pro-
tocols; roughly equal numbers "agreed" theircompany was afraid to
push back, or either "disagreed"or "strongly disagreed." Pharmaceuti-
cal company intervieweeswere more likely to agree that their regula-
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companies indicated they were lessfearful to push back on the FDA
regarding clinical protocol requirements,although this difference was
not quite statistically significant(p-value of no difference, 0.095).
Insufficient Dosing Anal!/ses in Phase IITrials Common
Bimodal responses also occurred inregards to whether companies ran
additional clinical trials not required by but inanticipation of questions
the FDA might ask. Biotech companies weremuch less likely to run
such additional trials, whereaspharmaceutical companies indicated
they did. Follow-up discussion revealedthat in many cases companies
ran additional trialsfor marketing and/or labeling purposes(including
quality of life analyses). While in a strict sense afew of these trials were
imnecessary for the approval of the drugbased on FDA requirements,
some companiesindicated they have tended to run additionalPhase
II trials to ensure they had identifiedthe proper dose effective range,
thereby reducing downside risksassociated with subsequent Phase III
trials.
A substantial number of companyinterviewees stated that failure
to run a sufficient numberof Phase II trials to detect the appropriate
dose range had been instrumental incausing failures in Phase III. Some
acknowledged they had witnessed development programswithin their
company that progressed toorapidly through Phase ii in order to get to
Phase III, perhaps due to demandsand pressures from the investment
community to show progress inreaching the next targeted develop-
ment milestone.
Many of the issues raised by industry werealso voiced by FDA offi-
cials, particularly those involving ratherhurried Phase II trials and
insufficiently extensive dosing analyses.Several FDA interviewees
identified the industry's tendency to focusexcessively on once daily
dosing regimens, for in some casesthat simply was unlikely to be
efficacious; in one failed Phase III studywith a once-daily dosing, for
example, the half-life of the drug was onlyfour hours, and the drug
was cleared before exerting anysignificant therapeutic effect.
Valuations of Existing and AdditionalCommunications with the FDA
Vary Systematically Except in PhaseII
Companies were asked to rate the qualityof their current communica-
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valuations of additional communications. A strikingset of findings was
the uniformly high valuation by industry and theFDA of additional
Phase II informal communications, butsystematic discordant FDA-
industiy valuations of such additionalcommunications during the
other drug development phases. Industryand FDA valuations of the
quality of current state of communicationswas generally higher during
the later development phases than in earlierstages.
Biotech companies on average rated the currentpreclinical commu-
nications with the FDA as being "good," but pharmaceuticalcompa-
nies rated their preclinical communications significantlylower, slightly
less than "fair." A similar pattern ofresponses emerged for quality of
communications during Phase I. However, FDA intervieweesconsis-
tently rated the quality of their communications withindustry sponsors
during the preclinical and Phase I stagesmore favorably than did
industry.
The assessments of quality of currentcommunications between
sponsors and the FDA were much more uniform for Phase II, but this
uniform rating was not a stellarone. Both biotech and pharmaceutical
companies rated the quality of their current interactionsduring Phase
II as being on average between fair and good,as did the FDA. A consis-
tent theme in cases where industry rated communicationsas "fair" was
the perceived variability in communications,ranging from extremely
poor to excellent, across the FDA's therapeutic divisions. Follow-up
discussion with FDA interviewees suggested thatthe FDA was aware
of this variability in communications quality withindustry across the
FDA's divisions during the early development phases.One FDA offi-
cial noted that the FDA had relatively littleexperience in the discov-
ery stage, although it has about 250 pre-IND meetings annually with
sponsors.
Viewed from both industry and FDA perspectives,the quality of
current communications between industry and the FDAwas gener-
ally higher during the later development phases thanin earlier stages.
During Phase III, both the FDA and overall industryrated the quality
of these communications as being closeto "good"; similarly, FDA and
overall industry perceptions were that the quality ofcommunications
during the NDA/BLA review stagewas "good."
To examine the importance of milestonemeetings with the FDA,
companies were asked to rate the value of the consultationat the end
of Phase II, prior to Phase III. At this meeting decisionsare often made
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the pivotal Phase III trials. Biotech andpharmaceutical respondents
uniformly rated this consultation as being on averageclose to "very
valuable."
Notably, while both pharmaceutical and biotechcompanies find the
end of Phase II meeting to be veryvaluable, earlier we reported they
also rate the quality of current interactionsduring Phase II as only on
average being "fair." Follow-updiscussion suggested that industry
believed that significant opportunities existfor higher quality com-
munications during this key drug developmentphase. Some industry
interviewees suggested that instituting a userfee program analogous
to PDUFA for early clinical studiesmight be useful, although perhaps
not all the way back to the IND orPhase I stages, particularly since a
considerable number of INDs are filed byindividuals and/or nonprofit
organizations.
Company and FDA interviewees wereasked how valuable additional
informal communications would be in the variousphases of drug devel-
opment. With little variability amongthem, companies rated such com-
munications extremely highlybeingbetween "valuable" and "very
valuable" during the preclinical and all theclinical phases, as well as
during the NDA/BLA review process. Oneglobal head of R&D sum-
marized industry's view succinctly, saying"Communication leads to
increased collaboration, and increased collaborationleads to successful
drug development."
By comparison, in four of the five stages,FDA interviewees rated
the value of such additional informalcommunications with sponsors as
significantly lower than did industrypreclinical,Phase I, Phase III and
NDA/BLA review. In each of these four stages,while industry valued
additional informal communications with theFDA as being on average
between "valuable" and "very valuable," meanFDA valuations were
either "ambivalent" or in between"ambivalent" and "valuable."
However, a striking result is that onlyduring Phase II do industry's
and the FDA's valuations of increased informalcommunications match
each otherboth rating these between"valuable" and "very valuable."
Notably, FDA interviewees apparently believethat the value of addi-
tional informal communications is muchhigher in Phase II than during
other drug development stages. Follow-updiscussion with FDA inter-
viewees revealed their belief that Phase IIdosing issues were critical,
and that a more formalized and extensivePhase hA meeting, sched-
uled at the time the first data on dosing becomeavailable, would be
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The FDA's experience is that at thisstage of the drug development
process, there is frequently a tension between the sponsor's"academic
science" and "commercial interests," and thata more formalized dis-
cussion and review of initial pharmacokineticand dosing data could
help to clarify development issues. At thatmeeting, FDA officials envis-
aged an increasingly important role for clinicalpharmacological analy-
ses. Waiting until the end of the Phase II studieswas often too late, they
argued, for by then sponsors had often madeup their minds on dos-
ing ranges for the subsequent Phase IIIpivotal studies. Another FDA
interviewee noted that currentlya Phase hA guidance paper was being
drafted and discussed with industry, whichit was hoped would help
sponsors deal more preemptively with dosing issues.
Our survey indicated further that industrywas willing to put its
money where its mouth is. Specifically, toassess the strength of their
desire for increased con-imunications, industryinterviewees were asked
whether their companies would be willingto pay more for communica-
tion with the FDA during various developmentphases to help the FDA
strengthen and expedite clinical developmentreviews, and to facilitate
discussions on various regulatory issues by hiringadditional staff. For
Phase I, 70 percent of respondents indicatedthey would be willing to
pay PDUFA types fees ranging between $100K and $500K, while30 per-
cent would be willing to pay between $500K and$1 million. Although
10 percent of respondents were unwillingto pay any PDUFA-type fees
during Phase II, about 40 percentwere willing to pay between $100K
and $500K, another 40 percentwere willing to pay between $500K and
$1 million, and 10 percent were willingto pay more than $1 million.
Finally, while 30 percent of respondentswere unwilling to pay PDUFA-
type fees for Phase III, 40 percent were willingto pay between $100K
and $1 million, and 30 percentwere willing to pay between $1 million
and $5 million. In none of the three phaseswas there any statistically
significant difference between pharmaceutical andbiotech companies,
although during Phase III pharmaceuticalcompany willingness to pay
tended to be greater than that by biotech firms.
These findings on the willingness of bothbiotech and pharmaceu-
tical companies to pay additionaluser fees underscore the industry's
perceived importance of participating in additionalquality commu-
nications with the FDA. In some instances, however,follow-up dis-
cussion revealed that certain companieswere hesitant to commit to
paying additional user fees uniess they could beassured any incre-
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improving communications between theFDA and sponsor, and that
metrics would be put in place to measureand monitor the incremental
hiring and review efforts.
Although on average FDA officials valuedadditional informal com-
munications in the early developmentphases less highly than did
industry, several FDA interviewees believedthere were substantial dif-
ferences across companies in the likelybenefits of such additional com-
munications, with small and lessexperienced companies being most
likely to benefit. One interviewee statedthat "Pfizer doesn't need it,"
and then added, "Merck has thieepeople who have been to more FDA
meetings than I have."
Industrj Cautious Regarding Developmentand Validation of
Biomarkers and Surrogate Markers
The FDA's March 2004 "CriticalPathways" document argued that
"The appearance of new quantitativemeasuring technologies abso-
lutely galvanizes new drug research."The document then went on
to state: "Additional biomarkers(quantitative measures of biological
effects that provide informative links betweenmechanism of action and
clinical effectiveness) and additional surrogatemarkers (quantitative
measures that can predicteffectiveness) are needed to guide product
development."13
While industry interviewees exhibited someenthusiasm for increased
use and developmentof surrogate markers, we learned thattheir out-
look was tempered with considerable caution.A substantial number
indicated that without appropriate guidancefrom the FDA, use of new
surrogate markers for primary efficacyendpoints was simply too risky
an undertaking.
Industry interviewees had a bimodal response towhether their com-
pany would be willing to usesurrogate markers under currentFDA
guidelines, with 50 percent indicating they were"somewhat likely"
or "very likely" versus 50percent being "ambivalent," "notlikely" or
"very unlikely." In cases where intervieweesindicated they were "very
likely" to use a surrogate marker, theytypically also stated that they
were attempting tovalidate the surrogate marker simultaneouslywith
their ongoing clinical trials, or wereemploying a marker previously
"accepted" by the FDA (e.g., CD4+ T-cell countsfor AIDS).
Given the challenges in validating surrogatemarkers, we then inquired
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induce companies to engage in additional developmentand valida-
tion of surrogate markers. While theaverage response was essentially
"somewhat likely," this was the only question wherewe observed sta-
tistically significant differences by interviewee rank; themore senior
management (executive vice presidents and higher) believed their
company would be less likely to employ surrogate markers ifpatent
protection were available, whereas those with rank ofvice-president
or lower stated their company would be more likely to doso. Jnterest-
ingly, while CR0 interviewee responses (whichwe classified separately
from industry and FDA) were generally indistinguishablefrom those
of industry on most issues, each of the (admittedlysmall number of)
CR0 interviewees indicated they would be "very likely"to employ and
validate surrogate markers were patent opportunitiesavailable.
Follow-up discussion diverged widely. Several intervieweesin both
pharmaceutical and biotech companies stated that itwould not be in
the interests of the research community public healthor even in the
long-term interest of their company if surrogatemarkers could be pat-
ented, for that could impede use of critical researchtools in their sub-
sequent drug development efforts. Rather than patenting themarker, a
number of interviewees suggestedan extension of market exclusivity
(such as that granted for pediatric indications), in exchangefor placing
the biomarker in the public domain, freely availablefor use by other
researchers and developers.
Additional discussion indicated great hesitancyon the part of inter-
viewees to rely on surrogate markers given current FDAguidelines
and practices. While numerous interviewees indicated thatbiomarkers
were extensively and increasingly used within their company to evalu-
ate safety concerns or to assist in "go/no go" decisions, inmost devel-
opment programs traditional and already-accepted clinical endpoints
still trumped biomarkers as efficacy and safetyendpoints.
Disagreement on the Value of FDA Advisory Board PanelMeetings
FDA division directors appoint advisory board membersin different
therapeutic areas to assist them in decision-making. Themost public
context in which advisory panels provide advice to the FDAis in the
final stages of the NDA/BLA reviewprocess, after the FDA has had time
to review and assess data from the application. Advisory boardpanel
meetings are public and typically webcast. In mostcases the sponsor
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patients' advocacy groups make testimonials,advisory board panel
members ask questions and finally, the advisoryboard panel votes on
whether to recommend to the FDA that theapplication be approved. In
most but not all cases, the FDA agreeswith the panel's recommenda-
tions. Notably, while the FDA advisoryboard panels are not involved
in the clinical development componentof drug development, they do
in fact play a key role in the drugapproval process.
Industry is sharply divided in its valuationof this advisory process
and panel meeting. On average, industry was"ambivalent" in its eval-
uation, with there being no systematicdifferences among pharmaceuti-
cal and biotech respondents. However,interviewees at the FDA rated
this process much more favorably, on averagein between "valuable"
and "very valuable." CROs tended to agree morewith the FDA than
with industry on this issue.
Proponents of the advisory panel processindicated that it was a criti-
cal point in the NDA/BLA process thatallowed the public and prac-
titioner physicians to evaluate thedrug, as well as witness the FDA
at work. Detractors were criticalof the advisory board process in no
uncertain terms. Several interviewees likenedthe process with colorful
descriptors as such "circus," "crap shoot,"and "dog and pony show."
Behind their colorful rhetoric, however,interviewees expressed great
concern over theconfrontational nature of the hearings. According to
several companies that have had verysuccessful approval hearings,
yet are sharply critical of the process,the meeting is set up with the
sponsoring company on one side, theFDA on the opposite side, and
the advisory board as the adjudicator.Some interviewees noted that
in communications with FDA officialsprior to the panel meeting, the
FDA voiced generally favorable evaluations, yet atthe public hearing
the FDA voiced primarily antagonistic views.
Industry interviewees indicated thatsubstantial amounts of money
and time are spent preparing for the"show." One company said that
in preparation for this meeting, itprepared 1000 backup slides, while
another claimed the number to be 1200. Thesemeeting preparations
are highly labor-intensive.While agreeing that the public is entitled to
learn about the NDA/BLA details given currentFederal regulations
(although also acknowledging that what ispublicly disclosed at a meet-
ing attended by competitors raisesstrategic issues for sponsors), and
that it is important the public see the FDA atwork, industry officials
often argued that the current process does notdo proper service to the
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Several interviewees, who were high-level FDApersOnnel prior to
joining industry, stated that panel expertsare often poorly prepared for
the review, "reading the materialon the plane ride to the FDA." These
respondents argued that given that the reviewprocess takes many FDA
personnel several months, it is improbable thata panelist could gain
sufficient understanding to renderan appropriately informed decision
after only a few hours of review time.
A substantial portion of industry respondents voicedconcern over the
qualifications of advisory panel members, indicating thatmore quali-
fied experts were often excluded due to implementationof "excessively
restrictive" conflict of interest regulations. Severalinterviewees stated
that the panel meeting environment broughtout some of the worst type
of behavior by academic panel members, enablingthem to "toot their
horn and spout off useless remarks."
From the perspective of several industry respondents,the FDA was
eminently well qualified to make the decisionon whether to approve
the NDA/BLA, following its typically extensiveand thorough review
of all the safety and efficacy data, and that advisoryboard panel meet-
ings were unnecessary. When controversial issuesemerge, they argued,
a better way of managing disagreements or uncertainties would beto
have another government agency suchas the NIH convene a forum
attended by leading experts (even those withcompany affiliations), the
FDA, industry, and academic personnel. Itwas not uncommon for these
types of discussions to move to the more general qualitativeissues of
how dispute resolution could be better handledat the FDA. Later on
we comment on this issue further.
While on average FDA interviewees viewed theadvisory board panel
process more favorably than industry, agency officialswere aware of
problems, and had some suggestions for improvement.First, for the
meetings to be constructive, considerable workwas required by FDA
staff, a staff already stressed by whatone official called a "Meetings
R Us" mentality, with more than 1300meetings annually between divi-
sions and sponsors. Another FDA intervieweeopined that the advi-
sory board panel meetings are sometimes helpful, sometimesnot, and
then argued that decisions regarding approval oftenare more nuanced
that just simply involving safety and efficacy. Inparticular, approval
decisions often concern detailed regulatory issuessuch as labeling
considerations, for which paneLmembers typically havelittle experi-
ence or training. These issues should be addressable, butconsiderable.
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experience provides a valuable perspectivein assessing potential ben-
efits and risks of using the new drug.Another FDA interviewee agreed,
stating "It all depends on how well youselect your participants." Yet
another agency official suggested using advisoryboard panels only for
selected applications, where their input is clearlyneeded.
Finally, a common theme that emerged fromfollow-up discussions
with industry was that these advisoryboard panel meetings provided
the FDA and industry a unique opportunityto educate the public (and
the FDA staff) on the importance of riskmanagement in the drug regu-
latory processnot just the safety andtoxicity risks from using the new
drug, but also the risks to patientsif access to this new medicine is
denied or delayed. Up to now, industry and seniorFDA staff have not
seized the opportunity to demonstrate atthese public forums the utility
of the concept of employing "reasonablerisk" as an approval criterion.
Rather, the public has been led to believethat drugs can and should
be "absolutely safe," which industrybelieves is in practice impossible.
While in principle the advisory board panel meeting processcould pro-
vide such public education, industry and theFDA have not yet worked
sufficiently hard to attain that goal.
V.Discussion and De Novo "Thinking Outsidethe Box"
The initial portion of the interviews weconducted involved interview-
ees responding to ourwritten statements or questions on a scaleof one
to five, and indicating to uswhich of the issues raised were of suffi-
cient importance or complexity thatthey wanted us to come back to
them later on in the interview. Near theend of each interview with
both industry and FDA respondents, weposed the following question
orally: "If you had the opportunity to createthe FDA de novo, on what
would you focus your efforts, and five yearsfrom now, in what ways
would you hope the FDA would differ mostmarkedly from what it is
today?" As a practical matter, in the finalportions of our interviews
respondents iterated back and forth on revisitingand expanding on
early questions, and on opining on the de novohypothetical. Our sum-
mary also mixes them.
Although respondents' comments ranged widely,three sets of issues
were raised repeatedly, in some casesboth by industry and the FDA.
First, industry accepts the notion thatthe onus of developing new med-
icines is on them, and not on the FDA. Theyaccept that the missions of
the FDA are to ensure the safety and efficacyof new medicines, and toOpportunities for Improving the Drug DevelopmentProcess 115
advance the public health by "helpingto speed innovations that make
medicines and foods more effective, saferand more affordable." The
missions and tasks facing the FDA differ fromthose facing industry A
strength of the FDA to this point is that itsmandate has been perceived
by industry, the FDA and the publicas being limited to evaluating
medications based on scientific criteria involvingsafety and efficacy,
and in particular, not on economic criteriainvolving comparative costs
and benefits. Industry is concerned thatwith closer collaborations
between the FDA and the Centers for Medicareand Medicaid Services,
this valuable separation of mandates mightbecome blurred, as it has
already in member states of the EMEA. This blurringis likely to expand
as the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit is implementedin
2006.
Second, industry and much of thecurrent FDA senior leadership
believes that over the years, the FDA hasfocused disproportionate
attention on the first of the two missions (productsafety and efficacy),
at the expense of meeting the second mission (helpingspeed innova-
tion), although when we conductedour interviews (in Spring 2004,
prior to the voluntary withdrawal of Vioxx),industry believed it was
observing some welcome signs of change.With respect to "helping to
speed innovations," guidance from andcollaboration with the FDA
can have significant positive impacts on how quickly andsuccessfully
pharmaceutical and biotech firmscarry out their drug development
efforts. While the onus of drug developmentis on industry, there is
much room for closer collaboration between industryand the FDA that
promotes the public health, particularly by sharinginformation dur-
ing early development stages in whichthe FDA's valuable knowledge
involving classes of compounds andmolecule structures could help
industry avoid failures and needlessly placingpatients at risk.
Third, a persistent themewe heard from industry interviews (and to
some extent, also from the FDA) was that communicationsprocesses
with the FDA needed to be bet±er managed.Increased communication
and interactions with the FDAwere viewed by industry as substantially
increasing information transparency andreducing information asym-
metry between the FDA and sponsors, therebymitigating development
uncertainty and risk, making the inherently riskydrug development
process more predictable. To be effective, however, theseincreased
communications efforts must be coupled with standardperformance
metrics and best practices across the FDA's therapeuticdivisions. Cur-
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17 therapeutic divisions and areasin the quality of communications
between the FDA and industry.
Both industry and FDA respondentsrecognized the existence of an
inherent tension, however, betweencredibly regulating an industry
and working with it to facilitatedevelopment of innovative products,
i.e., between gate-keeping anddevelopment. FDA officials expressed
particular strong caution that their supportiverole be confined to col-
laboration, and not include extensivepartnering. A delicate balance
must be maintained betweenattempting to acconunodate industry's
desires to know and the agency'sneed to safeguard its decision-mak-
ing process. That being said, bothindustry and the FDA recognize that
later phase information communications areby necessity likely to be
more constrained than thosepossible at earlier stages of the drug devel-
opment process. The uniformly highvaluation of additional Phase II
informal communications voiced both byFDA and industry may signal
that such efforts will be forthcoming.However, the discordant FDA-
industry valuations of suchadditional communications during the
earlier drug development phases arenotable. Both industry and FDA
officials stated that these issues merit carefulconsideration as the FDA
carries out its "Critical Pathways"initiatives with industry, academia,
other government agencies and thepublic.
Finally, our "de novo" questions alsoyielded several less commonly
voiced opinions. Among these were thefollowing:
Redefine the medical reviewer position at theFDA and mix it in with
service at the NIH and CDC. Make thejob description more attractive,
and perhaps institute a fellowship program.
Involve the medical associations more inthe review process, particu-
larly during the advisory boardpanel meeting.
Have one toxicology unit serve alltherapeutic divisions. More gen-
erally, the various therapeutic divisions arealigned too separately as
silos, and instead there needs to be morecross-division consultation.
Make the FDA more distant from thepolitical process. The Commis-
sioner of the FDA should be just asindependent of the executive and
legislative branches as is the Chairman ofthe Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve.
Split regulatory supervision of foodand agriculture off from the FDA,
making it focused only on the safetyand efficacy of medicines. Asking
senior staff to be conversant withsuch wide-ranging issues involving
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VI.Recommendations: Themes from Qualitative Discussions
The less structured qualitative portions ofour confidential interviews
with 49 industry and eight senior FDA officialsrepeatedly focused on
a number of suggested policy recommendations, whichinterview-
ees believed could lead to improved regulatory interactions between
industry and the FDA and make the drug developmentand regulatory
process more efficient, without compromising patient safety andwel-
fare. Among those voiced most frequentlyand with the greatest inten-
sity were the following:
Institute metrics and goals analogous to thosepresent in the Prescrip-
tion Drug User Fee Acts of 1992, 1997 and2002 into the drug develop-
ment portion of interactions with theagency. Sponsor companies would
be charged reasonable levels ofuser fees for increased interactions
during Phases II and III, not justupon submitting for review
approval a New Drug Applicationor a Biologic License Application.
The funds from sponsors would be usedto hire additional, well quali-
fied FDA staff to increase the interactionsand information flows with
sponsors.
Contract with an independent consultantto identify divisions that
are managed well, and that have been successful in fulfillingboth por-
tions of the FDA mission statement. Implementand regularly monitor
the diffusion of standard best practices from thetop-performing divi-
sions across the entire set ofagency divisions. Report on progress of
the diffusion of best practicesacross therapeutic areas in the PDUFA
annual report.
Establish an oversight board consisting of industry,agency officials,
and premier external scientists (possiblyat NIH or CDC), that convenes
at a minimum once a year to evaluate retrospectivelythe development
and regulatory history ofa randomly selected number of completed
and terminated drug developmentprojectsboth successful and failed.
This group would provide feedbackto the FDA and industry and pres-
ent actionable recommendations to improve theregulatory and devel-
opment process.
Establish an exchange program involvingindustry and FDA scien-
tists that exposes industry to the FDA andvice-versa. To mitigate sub-
sequent potential conflicts of interest, the FDA scientists wouldneed to
function in an industry project outside thereview domain of the divi-
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Collaborate on creating a more structuredand effective dispute reso-
lution system. The current ombudsmansystem is rarely, if ever used,
and informal processes are inconsistent,creating urnecessary uncer-
tainty and delaying decision-making.
Establish a knowledge data base, usingmodern information tech-
nology, that stores and makes availableinformation on issues concern-
ing classes of compounds andmolecule structures. Because the FDA is
defacto the custodian of a knowledge baseencompassing a much wider
range of molecules andsafety issues than is known by any in indus-
try, it has a unique opportunity toprovide developers with important
information concerning safety and efficacy.These data could also be
used in simulations and modeling involvingsafety and toxicity issues,
projected both backwards and forwards. Certainproprietary and intel-
lectual property issues will need to beaddressed to facilitate the shar-
ing of such information. However,allowing companies in ignorance
to conduct clinical trialswith compounds that share similar important
properties with compounds that haveprevious safety or toxicity fail-
ures is inconsistentwith protecting the public health.
Finally, we believe it important to bear inmind that issues involving
interactions between the FDA andindustrythe focus of this research
constitute only a portion of the much largerpuzzle of why the recent
substantially larger R&D efforts by industry havenot yielded commen-
surate growth in the number ofNDAs/BLAs submitted for approval
to the FDA. While resolutionof the communication and management
issues between the FDA and industrywould improve substantially the
drug development process and make it moreefficient, these process
solutions are not a substitute for theunderlying discovery and devel-
opment of innovative therapeutics.Ultimately, both industry and the
FDA believe the onus of drug developmentrests with the pharmaceuti-
cal and biotechnology industries. Thecomplementary missions of the
FDA are to continue to ensure the safetyand efficacy of medicines, and
simultaneously to advance the public health byhelping to speed inno-
vations that make medicines accessible tothe patients who need them.
VII.Study Limitations
Our study has a number of limitations.Although the study team took
considerable care in developing and testingthe quantitative and quali-
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could have been enhanced to delve deeperinto some of the key issues
that emerged. More pointed questionswould have been extremely
valuable in elucidating distinctions when theinterviewee responded
by giving a weightedaverage response. For example, interviewees
often responded with the answer "fair"or "variable" to the questions
regarding medical reviewers. Refinement of thesequestions to solicit
feedback on a per division basisor with percentage estimates might
have been more useful.
The sample of companies interviewed duringthis research was not
chosen at random from a listing of biotech,pharmaceutical, and CR0
companies. It was important for thepurpose of the research to inter-
view personnel at companies that had considerableexperience with
the FDA and drug development. Thecompanies we chose to interview
were admittedly nonrandom, and quite successfulas ofApril 2004,
they had a total market capitalization ofmore than one trillion dollars.
A random sampling of companies engagedin drug development would
not have ensured coverage of companies with significantdevelopment
experience. While not proven,we believe that the sample is representa-
tive of the major stakeholders of drug developmentwithin industry.
Virtually all the industry intervieweeswere engaged in R&D or regu-
latory activities. General management andsenior executives (e.g., chief
executive officer, chief financial officer)were not interviewed. Their
opinions on interactions with and evaluations ofthe FDA might be very
different given the greaterpressure they face from the investment com-
munity and shareholders.
Similarly, the eight senior FDA officials interviewedmay not be rep-
resentative of the entire leadership at the FDA.While the names of
several of the FDA intervieweeswere provided by the study team, the
majority of the eight FDA intervieweeswere selected by the FDA.
Finally, these interviewswere conducted in Spring 2004, several
months before Merck's voluntary withdrawal ofVioxx on September
30, 2004, and also before Congressional hearingson the safety of anti-
depressant medications for pediatricpopulations. The opinions and
views of both industry and FDA intervieweesmay have changed over
the intervening time period.
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